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1 Few critical analyses of the concept and practices of “transitional justice” are written by
the victims of political violence themselves. This book is one of them for it is a narrative
of a personal history as it is intertwined with the history of political violence in Morocco.
It is significantly important to specify,  from the outset,  the definition of “victim,” as
posited by the author: a plural entity, given that the number of victims of any given
politics of systematic violence always includes networks of other people who become
indirectly victimized with the loss of a relative, for example. Indeed, when a person is
victimized—that is to say, imprisoned, “disappeared” or murdered—it is the livelihood of
all of his or her family that is jeopardized, an entire familial unit that has forever been
affected and possibly destroyed.
2 It is in this sense that the author is a victim of political violence. She is not herself a
former  prisoner,  nor  has  she  been  personally  injured,  but  major  tragic  events  that
destabilized the author’s family marked a significant part of her life and, as they are
embodied and incorporated into her memory,  constitute the catalyst  for writing this
account. Early in the seventies of the last century, when the author was one month old,
her  father,  Aziz  Loudiy,  a  twenty-three-year-old  Marxist-Leninist,  was  arbitrarily
arrested and sentenced to ten years in prison for his political activism, as a vice-president
of  the National  Union of  Moroccan Students  (UNEM)—which was  considered to  be  a
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clandestine organization seeking to overthrow the monarchy. The father’s brother-in-
law, the author’s uncle, Aziz Mnebhi, and the president of UNEM, was also kidnapped,
kept in secret captivity and tortured for over a year. When he was released pending his
sentencing, he escaped to France, where he sought political asylum. His own sister, the
author’s aunt, Saida Menebhi, was arrested, sentenced and thrown in jail in 1975 where
she died two years  later  following a  hunger strike to demand the status  of  political
prisoner.  In addition to her father’s,  uncle’s  and aunt’s  ordeals,  her mother,  Khadija
Menebhi,  was also subjected to regular interrogations and harassment for almost ten
years.
3 This personal tragedy is situated within the global history of state-sponsored political
violence  in  Morocco,  namely  the  “Years  of  Lead,”  a  period,  extending  from  the
Independence of the country, in 1956, to the death of the former King Hassan II, in July
1999. It was, in fact, an epoch marked by sheer violence and utter repression of all those
who were considered a threat to the king’s legitimacy and the nation security. Forcible
disappearances, torture and long prison sentences targeted men and women, children
and old people, sons and daughters, mothers and fathers, husbands and wives, sisters and
brothers.  Yet,  besides  her  personal  involvement,  Fadoua  Loudiy’s  objective  is  not  to
scrutinize this very history of violence but how to exit from it and, beyond the Moroccan
experience of dealing with its bloody past, she seeks to problematize the whole idea of
transitional justice relying on her academic expertise in rhetoric and the philosophy of
communication.  Loudiy draws mainly from Paul  Ricœur’s  philosophy of  memory and
justice in which the historical work is defined as a narrative about suffering and injustice
of those who have survived atrocities—the “all-too-often forgotten voices of transitional
justice.” In contrast to a legalistic perspective, more concerned by textual amendments,
this approach is focused on how victims, individually and collectively, rely on rhetorical
practices to negotiate their victimhood and attempt to reconstruct a civic identity as part
of their national community. The need to revisit the past, Loudiy argues, comes from the
phenomenological  understanding  that  its  legacy,  with  its  sacrifices  and  injustices,
constitutes the thread that makes people part of a given community; hence, the future of
a nation cannot be built on the negation or selective remembering of its past, cruel as it
might be, for the history of violence is embodied by the victims in their flesh and bones.
4 On the  basis  of  these  specifications,  the  author  addresses  relevant  criticisms  to  the
Moroccan  experience  of  transitional  justice  led  by  the  Commission  of  Equity  and
Reconciliation  (IER).  Despite  many  accomplishments—notably  the  gathering  of  a
significant archive of material evidence—the experience, according to her, has been a
missed opportunity since the process lacked the fundamental tenets of authentic truth
and reconciliation. Therefore, the process has failed to provide the nation with renewed
ethos,one based on a sense of justice conceived in both a social and symbolic sense. In
other words, the State’s efforts to remedy the harm incurred by victims of the “Years of
Lead” have been insufficient  in securing justice,  leading to victims becoming cynical
about the authenticity of the State’s motives in addressing that legacy. Loudiy argues
precisely that the initial framework of this Moroccan commission was, in essence, anti-
democratic for unlike most Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC), only a select
number of victims were invited to participate in the hearings and the selection criteria
were never made public. The IER’s hearings were seen as disingenuous and exclusive by
many victims and human rights advocates, to such an extent that some associations, i.e., 
the  Moroccan Association of  Human Rights  and the  Moroccan Forum for  Truth and
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Justice, sponsored alternative public hearings in which many witnesses raised the fact
that  the  State’s  efforts  were  not  successful  in  providing  either  truth,  justice  or
reconciliation. 
5 Moreover, the official rhetoric of transitional justice in Morocco has been focused on
counting to the detriment of accountability, as the moral idea of the pursuit of truth and
justice  is  confused with the more practical  issue of  material  compensation.  In  other
words, reparations were exclusively related to cash, while other forms of reparation, such
as official apology and expressions of remorse and regret which are equally, if not more,
important than material compensations, have been neglected. Money, as Loudiy put it,
can repair  some of  the physical  damages,  but  it  cannot erase the trauma and losses
suffered by the victims, nor can it restore confidence in State institutions and officials.
This is true because when reparations are not part of a wider project of institutional
reforms that seek to prevent the repetition of abuses, they cannot participate in changing
dominant political culture. Some victims, as in many other experiences of transitional
justice, have refused to accept monetary compensations unless they are accompanied by
political, rhetorical and symbolic efforts to acknowledge their suffering and by public
attempts to “make good again” and to avoid rebounding violence. In their point of view,
genuine  reparations,  i.e.,accountability,  responsibility,  apology,  and  preserving  the
memory of victims of political injustices, should focus on effecting political and economic
change that is conducive to social justice and democracy. 
6 However, since a kind of retributive justice is difficult to achieve in the case of mass
atrocities, especially when the State bureaucracies, as in Morocco, are involved and crime
has been institutionalized as part of the State policy. Hence, distinguishing between guilt
and responsibility can become a tedious and morally challenging endeavor. In this case,
what does the praxis of justice entail? To answer this question, the author draws mainly
from Paul Ricœur’s philosophy of justice in which both retributive (or punitive) justice
and restorative justice are doomed to be inadequate in achieving the just, for they both
run  the  risk  of  reproducing  the  original  injustice.  While  retributive  justice  focuses
excessively on the guilty party, restorative justice focuses excessively on the other party,
the victim, and can contribute to a culture of victimhood. Accordingly, Loudiy argues that
seeking punitive justice  should not  preclude the possibility  of  a  more relational  and
dialogic approach in which the outcome of any justice must involve the persons who
committed the harmful acts and those who were affected directly or indirectly by them.
In  Morocco,  the  exclusion  of  perpetrators  from  the  process  was  part  of  the  deal
negotiated between the monarchy and those former political prisoners who accepted to
be part of the IER. The mandate of the IER did not allow for judicial prosecutions or
indictment  of  those  accused  of  torture,  disappearance  or  murder  of  thousands  of
innocent citizens. Furthermore, the fact that the IER’s scope was limited to victims entails
that any truths that the State had been seeking through this process were bound to be
one-sided and partial.
7 The author calls for “symbolic justice”—more focused on “symbolic” forms of reparation
—that can help in “restoring” the relationship between victims and perpetrators, in order
to rebuild a responsible and ethical community. Therefore, reparations should be part of
the effort to repair political relationships and ensure that measures are put in place to
safeguard against such happenings in the future, highlighting simultaneously the moral
and  political  necessity  that  the  State  (and  its  machineries  and  officials)  be  held
accountable for criminal actions against their own citizens. While focusing on restoring
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past victims within society, notably through active, ongoing public discourse and writings
about the past and preserving the community’s public memory, symbolic justice does not
preclude  accountability.  On  one  hand,  this  justice  entails  a  sense  and  practice  of
“recapacitation,” for those who have been incapacitated, deprived of their status not only
as  citizens  but  also  as  human  beings.  In  short,  what  can  be  progressively  acquired
through reparative programs is a sense of capability and the power to act. On the other
hand,  tantamount to recognition and capacity is  an imperative for  some measure of
accountability for criminal behaviors against innocent victims, especially when officials
acting on behalf of the State conduct these actions.
8 It is necessary, therefore, to establish the proper distance between the author of a crime
and his or her victim(s), a distance that is crucial for the ethical and political foundations
of  any  human community.  The  perpetrators’  ethosneeds  to  be  revealed,  so  that  any
authority  they  might  still  have  is  effectively  abolished  and  that,  even  without
punishment, they are still socially judged and obliged to bear the burden of their evil
actions. This second aspect of symbolic justice concerns the issue of “imputability.” This
notion is capital to Loudiy’s argument: if a criminal act cannot be imputed to its author,
impunity  becomes the rule  that  undermines  the law in a  society.  In  other  words,  if
actions, whether just or unjust, cannot be imputed to particular actors within a society,
impunity becomes a norm that can lead to ethical confusion and moral corruption. Thus,
imputability  is  not  only  about  accountability  and  responsibility,  but  also  about
establishing morality as the basis of social and political relations and interactions. 
9 According to Loudiy, such a new way of conceiving justice, as symbolic justice, offers a
change in the telosembodied in the ideas of restoration and reconstruction that are often
invoked in the resolution of social conflicts. In her perspective, the end is neither the law,
nor the victim nor the accused, but it is rather the organic bond that holds a human
community together. When harm is done and not imputed, it is not only the suffering of
the victim and her intimate identity that are at stake, but the whole social bond that is
damaged. This is why, for the author, transitional justice should first and foremost be an
occasion  for  civic  deliberation  about  the  ethosof  the  polis,which  should  involve
conversations that aim at reconfiguring a distant past, redefining a people’s ethical aim,
and reinvigorating citizens’ political capacity to act. In other words, justice should be, as
in Ricœur’s perspective, a project (the same project as memory) that shapes and gives
form to the future. 
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